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1 
FOREWORD 
ROBERT GATTER* 
On February 22, 2013, the Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law 
and Policy and the Center for Health Law Studies at Saint Louis University 
School of Law sponsored their Annual Health Law Symposium entitled, 
“Regulating Dual-Use Research in Life Sciences.” The symposium brought 
together an interdisciplinary group of experts both in the life sciences and in 
law for an engaging day of lecture and discussion about how best to protect 
against the misuse of discoveries in the life sciences while still pursuing their 
many benefits. In particular, the symposium sought an answer to what role 
the law should play in striking that balance. 
Little did we know that, on the very day of the symposium, the federal 
government would release notice of a proposed rule-making on dual use 
research of concern (DURC)1 to go along with guidelines it had issued 
eleven months earlier.2 As a result, the symposium became more than an 
opportunity for the panel of speakers to lecture on the topic of regulating 
DURC. It became a forum for a creative dialogue among the gathered 
panelists as well as faculty, students, and guests about the new proposed 
rules and how they add to or detract from the twin goals of promoting 
research for the life sciences while securing the public against the risk that 
such research is misused. This issue presents articles written for the 
symposium and then re-written in light of the fruitful discussion held during 
the gathering. 
The issue features a diverse set of articles because the collection of 
authors has expertise not only in law, but also in laboratory research and 
international diplomacy, and this variety is apparent in the different 
perspectives from which each author addresses the role of law in managing 
DURC. That said, there are common themes among the articles. Chief 
 
* Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Health Law Studies, Saint Louis University 
School of Law. 
 1. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR 
INSTITUTIONAL OVERSIGHT OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN 11 (2013), 
https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/documents/oversight-durc.pdf. 
 2. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR 
OVERSIGHT OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN 1, 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/us-policy-durc-032812.pdf. 
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among them is a theme of trust. Most of the articles acknowledge that 
successfully managing DURC requires trust between the public at large and 
the research enterprise, between the research and national security 
communities, and among countries that share a global public health 
commons. Accordingly, this raises the question of what, if any, role the law 
plays in establishing and maintaining such trust. Another related theme 
among all of the articles is that the law, by itself, cannot sustain a successful 
regime for managing DURC. In addition to law, professionalism among 
scientists is necessary as well as leadership from research institutions. 
Moreover, biodiplomacy must fill in wherever the international rule of law is 
weak. 
The issue opens with an article by Dr. David Franz, who brings a wealth 
of laboratory and leadership experience to his scholarship, following a 
distinguished career in the U.S. Army Medical Research and Material 
Command. Dr. Franz is skeptical that law is a helpful tool in managing 
DURC. Instead, he makes a persuasive case that leadership among 
researchers and within laboratories is the lynchpin to minimizing the security 
risks associated with DURC. 
A recent example of scientific self-censorship is apropos of Franz’s 
thesis. A group of scientists and physicians identified a new neurotoxin 
produced by botulism that is dangerous to humans and for which there is no 
current antidote. Concerned that publishing the genetic sequence of the new 
neurotoxin could lead to deliberate and harmful misuse of the new toxin, the 
scientists and physicians who made this discovery chose not to reveal the 
sequencing in any publication concerning the neurotoxin.3 Based on 
professional values and without the intervention of the law, these scientists 
and researchers struck an appropriate balance between public security and 
public health. 
Dr. Carole Baskin and Dr. Todd Richardson’s article is also written from 
the perspective of research professionals. They trace the history of DURC 
and its oversight in the U.S. and, in light of that history, critically examine the 
government’s policy and proposed regulations. In so doing, they highlight 
potential flaws, including most notably, the regulations’ reliance on 
Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBCs) to assure compliance, even though 
those committees lack the expertise and training to conduct a dual use 
review. Additionally, they warn that legal risks associated with the 
complicated relationship among the Select Agents regulations, export 
control laws, and the proposed DURC regulations will chill important life 
sciences research. They close by arguing for the development of best 
 
 3. See David A. Reelman, Editorial “Inconvenient Truths” in the Pursuit of Scientific 
Knowledge and Public Health, 209 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 170 (2014). 
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practices for DURC management led by scientific accreditation 
organizations. 
Professor Vickie Williams takes us next in a distinctly constitutional 
direction, examining the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and its 
application to any censorship of government funded DURC. Researchers 
and research institutions cannot be forced to waive their free speech rights 
as a condition of receiving federal funding for their research. Professor 
Williams argues that, if, as a condition of funding, researchers conducting 
DURC must agree to allow the government to review and potentially redact 
portions of their research papers prior to publication, such a regulatory 
regime is an unconstitutional invasion of researchers’ free speech rights. She 
explores how federal regulations might be crafted to avoid such a 
constitutional pitfall. 
Professor Victoria Sutton moves the discussion from the domestic to the 
international stage, demonstrating that biodiplomacy is essential to the 
successful management of DURC. She makes the case that public health is 
high on the list of international priorities. Yet, the rule of law is not uniformly 
respected nation-to-nation. Accordingly, she concludes that threats to global 
public health, including DURC, will fall within the realm of international 
politics and biodiplomacy. 
Finally, my own contribution is a reply to Dr. Franz. I argue that the right 
kind of legal regulation plays an essential role in managing DURC because 
the law is a powerful tool that can both signal that the scientific community 
is trustworthy and provide an oversight mechanism to promote public 
confidence in scientific self-regulation. The article makes the case that, while 
imperfect, the proposed federal regulations have the potential to be the right 
kind legal intervention. 
Advances in the life sciences have defined our time as the “Biological 
Century.”4 “Never before in history,” says David Relman, “has an area of 
science offered as much potential for novel insight and predictive 
understanding of the world, as well as opportunities for enhancing the 
human condition, as have the life sciences.”5 At the same time, however, 
these same insights can be misused to threaten public safety and national 
security. Our hope is that the articles in this issue contribute to a better 
understanding of how best to manage dual use risks and what role the law 
can play in doing so. 
 
 4. David A. Relman, The Biological Century: Coming to Terms with Risk in the Life 
Sciences, 11 NATURE IMMUNOLOGY 275, 275 (2010). 
 5. Id. 
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